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HOW SAFE IS THE HARBOR? CONSIDERING 
THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT IN SECTION 271(e)(1) ANALYSIS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 
(“Hatch-Waxman”)1 created a safe harbor2 provision that protects a 
generic drug company from infringement liability when manufacturing 
and testing a brand-name (patented) drug before the patent expires.3 The 
Supreme Court reasoned that the safe harbor sought to eliminate a pioneer 
drug company’s de facto extension of patent rights beyond the expiration 
of the patent term.4  
Before Hatch-Waxman, it was considered patent infringement for a 
generic competitor to begin the lengthy regulatory approval process prior 
to the expiration of a pioneer drug company’s brand-name patent, which 
effectively extended the life of the patent.5 The safe harbor created a 
defense to patent infringement that allowed generic manufacturers to test a 
 1. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 
Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000) & 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000)) (commonly referred to 
as the Hatch-Waxman Act because of its two primary sponsors, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and 
Congressman Henry Waxman (D-CA)). Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984: Remarks on Signing S. 1538 Into Law, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1359 (Sept. 24, 1984) 
[hereinafter Presidential Remarks]. 
 2. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). This section is called the “safe harbor” provision because it 
allows a generic manufacturer to develop its version of a patented drug within a “safe harbor” or 
without fear of liability for patent infringement. Stephanie E. Piatt, Note, Regaining the Balance of 
Hatch-Waxman in the FDA Generic Approval Process: An Equitable Remedy to the Thirty-Month 
Stay, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 163, 172 (2003); see also Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck 
KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 866 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 73 U.S.L.W. 3059 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2005) 
(No. 03-1237) (stating that although the express language of the safe harbor says “that ‘it shall not be 
an act of infringement’ to carry out research activities . . . the statute has been coined an ‘exemption’ 
in the case law, drawing from terminology used in the legislative history” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-
857, pt. 2, at 5 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2689)). 
 3. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (stating “[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to make . . . a patented 
invention . . . for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a 
Federal law”). 
 4. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 670 (1990). Because a generic competitor 
could not “infringe” a patent to begin testing a generic version of a drug before the patent of the brand-
name drug expired, the brand-name drug was afforded extended patent protection beyond the life of 
the patent to include the length of time necessary for the generic competitor to secure FDA approval 
for its own version of the drug (a situation referred to as a de facto extension of the pioneer drug 
company’s patent rights). Id. (discussing the de facto extension of a patentee’s monopoly rights); see 
also Jones, infra note 41, at 478 (describing the de facto extension of a patentee’s patent term as a 
“back-end distortion.”). 
 5. See infra notes 22–46 and accompanying text. 
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generic version of a patented drug for regulatory purposes before the 
patent expires:6 consequently, generic manufacturers can market their drug 
as soon as the brand-name patent expires. Initially, the safe harbor 
shielded infringers only if their activities were for the purpose of 
developing information that would be submitted to the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) for drug approval.7 However, courts have 
expanded the scope of the safe harbor to include medical devices8 and 
recombinant proteins even though the proteins cannot be approved under 
the new generic FDA approval process.9 Recently, one district court 
articulated the scope of the safe harbor infringement protection to “apply 
to all activities reasonably related to an actual or possible FDA 
application,”10 seemingly covering all activities along the chain of 
experimentation that may lead to new drugs subject to FDA approval. 
Confusion among courts regarding the scope of safe harbor protection left 
the biotechnology industry wondering whether its research tool patents 
would be protected against infringement.11
Addressing this concern, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit in Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA,12 held that the safe 
harbor only applies to pre-patent-expiration activities “reasonably related” 
 6. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.  
 7. See infra notes 80–82 and accompanying text.  
 8. Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. 661 (holding that the testing and marketing of a cardiac defibrillator falls 
under the safe harbor exception). 
 9. See infra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 10. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833 (RPP), 2001 WL 
1512597, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001); see also id. at *3 (adopting reasoning from Intermedics, Inc. 
v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 1991), that Congress did not intend for a party to 
lose the safe harbor exemption “simply because it turns out, after the fact, that some of that party’s 
otherwise infringing ‘uses’ either failed to generate information in which the FDA was interested” or 
were not necessary to secure FDA approval). 
 11. Richard J. Warburg & Stephen B. Maebius, Warning: Research Dollars at Risk! IP Law 
Must Support Old Patents and New Research. Any Imbalance Threatens to Shut Down the New-Drug 
Pipeline, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 24, 2003, at 28, (stating biotechnology companies believed that patents 
would shield their research tool technology). However, recently courts have held that research on new 
drugs using patented tools does not infringe those patents under the safe harbor. Id. This conclusion 
could open up the gates for free use of biotechnology companies’ patented chemicals; as a result the 
biotechnology firms may lose the financial ability to continue innovation because they depend on 
revenue from larger pharmaceutical companies. Id.; see also 331 F.3d at 867 (realizing the potential 
effect on the biotechnology industry, the court reasoned that expansion of the safe harbor outside the 
scope of FDA approval would “effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees owning 
biotechnology tool patents”); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 1575, 1676 (2003) (describing the biotechnology industry as “in part about pharmaceuticals—
and therefore prospect theory—and in part about DNA research—and therefore anticommons theory”). 
 12. 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 73 U.S.L.W. 3059 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2005) (No. 03-
1237).  
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to acquiring FDA approval of a drug already on the market13 and does not 
“globally embrace all experimental activity that at some point, however 
attenuated, may lead to an FDA approval process.”14
While the Federal Circuit correctly decided the case, it failed to 
articulate a rule that reduces the vagueness surrounding the assessment of 
what activities are “reasonably related” to the FDA approval process.15 
Currently, biotechnology assets are threatened because the safe harbor, 
which was originally enacted to permit drug manufacturers to use patented 
drugs to gain FDA approval of generic drugs, is being applied to 
biotechnology research tools.16 This Note proposes a new standard for 
evaluating infringement liability under the safe harbor that focuses on 
Congress’s original intent and ensures uniform application in the 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries. This Note will: (1) explain 
why the Hatch-Waxman safe harbor was needed;17 (2) examine the 
relationship between the FDA approval process and how it implicates the 
safe harbor;18 (3) analyze the case law leading up to the Integra decision;19 
(4) assess the impact of the Integra decision as it applies to the safe harbor 
and the biotechnology industry;20 and (5) propose a new test, based on the 
economic impact of the infringing activity, for evaluating whether 
activities that are otherwise infringing are protected by the safe harbor.21
II. THE HATCH-WAXMAN SAFE HARBOR: 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) 
Prior to 1984, there was no established FDA approval procedure for 
generic manufacturers seeking to produce brand-name drugs that were 
approved after 1962.22 Consequently, there were roughly 150 drugs 
 13. Id. at 867. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See infra notes 176–78 and accompanying text.  
 16. Jian Xiao, Carving Out a Biotechnology Research Tool Exception to the Safe Harbor 
Provision of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 23, 25–26 (2003) (discussing the 
biotechnology industry and the threat posed by the courts’ recent application of the safe harbor to 
research tools).
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See infra Part V. 
 20. See infra Part VII. 
 21. See infra Part VIII. 
 22. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647. In 1962, 
amendments to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (“FFDCA”) required all new generic and 
pioneer drugs be “approved as safe and effective prior to marketing.” Id. at 16. Thus, Abbreviated 
New Drug Applications (“ANDAs”) were available to generic manufacturers seeking approval of 
brand-name drugs approved before 1962 but not after. Hatch-Waxman created ANDA availability for 
generic manufacturers to pursue approval of a brand-name compound that was approved after 1962.  
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approved after 1962 that were “off patent” for which there was no generic 
equivalent.23 As the pharmaceutical industry began to increase the prices 
of brand-name drugs, consumers became frustrated over the unavailability 
of less expensive substitutes.24 Thus, in 1984, Congress passed the Hatch-
Waxman Act25 in an attempt to balance the needs of three groups: pioneer 
drug manufacturers, generic drug manufacturers, and consumers.26
Prior to Hatch-Waxman, a brand-name (research-based) drug 
manufacturer’s monopoly rights were effectively extended for the time 
required for a generic manufacturer to gain regulatory approval because 
the generic manufacturer was prohibited from using the brand-name drug 
to apply for FDA approval during the term of the patent.27 Also prior to 
Hatch-Waxman, the Federal Circuit in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar 
Pharmaceutical Co.28 held that section 271(a)29 prohibits “any and all uses 
of a patented invention,”30 and the experimental use exception31 did not 
apply to infringement of a drug patent for the purpose of obtaining data 
required by the FDA.32 Thus, Roche required that a competing generic 
 23. Id. at 17. The Committee on Energy and Commerce noted that all of these drugs could be 
approved in generic form if there was an established procedure. Id. Also, the Committee estimated that 
the availability of generic versions of drugs approved by the FDA after 1962 “would save American 
consumers $920 million over the next 12 years.” Id. 
 24. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.  
 25. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000). 
 26. Ralph G. Schroeder & Paul Papas, Protecting the Balance of Hatch-Waxman: Understanding 
the Industry’s New Dynamics for the 21st Century, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 19 (2001). See generally 
Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development 
Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187 (1999) (giving a general overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and 
its legislative history). 
 When President Ronald Reagan signed the bill into law on September 24, 1984, he articulated the 
balance achieved by the bill stating, “[s]o when you add it all up, this bill will provide regulatory 
relief, increased competition, economy in government, and best of all, the American people will save 
money, and yet receive the best medicine that pharmaceutical science can provide.” Presidential 
Remarks, supra note 1, at 1360.  
 27. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application of Hatch-Waxman Act, 180 
A.L.R. FED. 487, 508 (2002). Specifically, Hatch-Waxman sought to ensure that the patentee’s rights 
did not de facto “extend past the expiration of the patent term because a generic competitor also could 
not enter the market without regulatory approval.” Integra, 331 F.3d at 865 (citing Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. 
at 669–70). See generally Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act: 
History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585 (2003) (discussing the historical background 
of the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic drug competition, and the Hatch-Waxman safe harbor). 
 28. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 29. Section 271(a) states: “Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority 
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the 
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.” 35 
U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). 
 30. 733 F.2d at 861. 
 31. See infra note 154.  
 32. 733 F.2d at 863 (stating that Bolar’s use of flurazepam HCl to “derive FDA required test data 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/8
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drug manufacturer wait until the expiration of the brand-name drug patent 
before beginning the clinical and laboratory trials that are required by the 
FDA and are necessary to market a generic version of the drug.33
In response, Congress legislatively overruled the Federal Circuit’s 
narrow interpretation of the common law experimental use doctrine in 
Roche by creating the Hatch-Waxman safe harbor.34 The safe harbor 
allows competitors to manufacture and test the generic version of a drug35 
in advance of patent expiration as long as the infringing activities are 
“reasonably related” to securing regulatory approval.36 The safe harbor 
provides that “it shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to 
sell, or sell . . . a patented invention . . . which is primarily manufactured 
. . . solely for uses reasonably related [to the FDA approval process].”37  
is thus an infringement of [the patent]”).  
 33. Nicholas Groombridge & Sheryl Calabro, Integra Lifesciences v. Merck—Good for 
Research or Just Good for Research Tool Patent Owners?, 22 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 462, 463 
(2003). Bolar Pharmaceuticals wanted to produce a generic version of Roche’s Dalmane (flurazepam 
HCl). 733 F.2d at 860. Because a generic drug’s commercial success is based on how quickly it is 
brought to market after the brand-name patent expires and because of the lengthy FDA approval 
process, Bolar began to gather data for FDA submission while Roche’s patent was still in force. Id. 
Bolar did not market or sell its drug prior to Roche’s patent expiration. Id. 
 34. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.  
 35. See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Plain Talk About Prescription 
Drug Patents, at http://www.phrma.org/publications/policy/02.01.2002.426.cfm (last visited Oct. 16, 
2004) [hereinafter PHRMA] (stating Hatch-Waxman allows a generic drug manufacturer to 
“piggyback on the innovator’s years of testing” and also allows the generic company to manufacture 
and test the generic drug before the patent expires); Holly Soehnge, The Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Fine-Tuning the Balance Between the Interests of Pioneer and 
Generic Drug Manufacturers, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 51, 52–53 (2003) (stating that generic 
manufacturers get simplified FDA approval requirements for generic versions of pioneer drugs); see 
also Laura J. Robinson, Analysis of Recent Proposals to Reconfigure Hatch-Waxman, 11 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 47, 51 (2003) (stating that Hatch-Waxman provided three major benefits to generic 
manufacturers: (1) the ANDA; (2) the right to make and test generic versions of a pioneer drug brand-
name patent expires; and (3) the incentive of receiving 180 days of market exclusivity for being the 
first generic manufacturer on the market). 
 36. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000); see also Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 27, at 604–06 
(discussing the section 271(e)(1) safe harbor). 
 37. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). The section 271(e)(1) safe harbor states: 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United 
States or import into the United States a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or 
veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily manufactured using 
recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving 
site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the 
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.  
Id. 
 Before various amendments, the original (1984) text of the safe harbor stated: 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, or sell a patented invention (other than a 
new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal 
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Hatch-Waxman also benefits pioneer drug companies. Due to the 
lengthy FDA approval process,38 pioneer drug companies (research-based) 
found their effective patent life decreasing by the increasing amount of 
time it took for their product to secure FDA approval.39 Hatch-Waxman 
amends the Patent Law Act (codified at 35 U.S.C.) and grants pioneer 
drug manufacturers an extension on their patent term due to the prolonged 
regulatory approval process.40  
Ultimately, Hatch-Waxman seeks to restore patent terms to pioneer 
drug manufacturers that have been eroded by the lengthy FDA approval 
process41 and to stimulate the generic drug industry,42 which would create 
access to less expensive medications for consumers.43 While pioneer drug 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913)) solely for uses reasonably 
related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which 
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.  
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1984).  
 38. In 2001, the FDA’s median approval time for standard new molecular entities (“NMEs,” or 
new drugs not given priority status) was 14 months. FDA Talk Paper: Activities of FDA’s Medical 
Product Centers in 2001 (Jan. 25, 2002), at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/answers/2002/ 
ans01132.html. See also infra notes 48–61 and accompanying text.  
 39. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 40. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000). Section 156 states:  
(a) The term of a patent which claims a product, a method of using a product, or a method of 
manufacturing a product shall be extended in accordance with this section from the original 
expiration date of the patent, which shall include any patent term adjustment granted under 
section 154(b), if— . . . (4) the product has been subject to a regulatory review period before 
its commercial marketing or use . . . .  
Id. 
 41. Phillip B.C. Jones, Navigating the Hatch-Waxman Act’s Safe Harbor, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
475, 478 (2002) (stating that the lengthy FDA approval process created a “‘front-end distortion,’ a 
decrease in the effective patent term of a pioneer drug”); see also Schroeder & Papas, supra note 26, at 
25 (citing a study from the “Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development [which] found that the 
mean effective patent life of new drugs . . . was 11.2 years. This compares to the 20 year full-term 
granted by a patent and an 18 year average effective patent life for inventions other than drugs.”). 
 42. See Kristin E. Behrendt, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Balancing Competing Interests or Survival 
of the Fittest?, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247, 249 (2002) (stating that “[p]rior to 1984, generic drug 
manufacturing was not a robust industry.”). In 1984 there were roughly 150 brand name drugs, whose 
patent protection had expired, with no generic equivalents. Id. Prior to 1984, there was little economic 
incentive for a generic drug manufacturer to enter the market due to the lengthy FDA approval 
process. Id. Now, the generic drug industry fills more than 40% of all drug prescriptions. Schroeder & 
Papas, supra note 26, at 19. 
 43. Behrendt, supra note 42, at 250 (stating that Hatch-Waxman, in part, intended to cater to 
consumer interests by making low cost generic drugs available). See Schroeder & Papas, supra note 
26, at 19 (addressing the compromise between the consumer’s need for low-priced drugs and the need 
of the pharmaceutical industry to protect innovation); see also Charles P. Alexander, Prescription for 
Cheap Drugs: Congress Aims to Encourage Alternatives to Brand-Name Medicines, TIME, Sept. 17, 
1984, at 64 (discussing the frustration of consumers over the high price of prescription drugs and the 
financial benefit of generic drugs); Michael Waldholz, Pillbox War: Drug Battle Heats up Between 
Brand-Name and Generic Makers—Big Firms Appeal to Doctors, Pharmacists and Courts to Stall 
Low-Cost Rivals, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1984, at 8 (discussing the tension between brand-name drug 
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companies benefit from an extended patent term, generic manufactures 
and consumers44 benefit from Abbreviated New Drug Applications 
(“ANDAs”),45 which truncate the generic drug approval process, and from 
the safe harbor exemption of section 271(e)(1), which allows generic 
drugs to complete the FDA approval process before the brand-name patent 
expires.46 The cumulative effect for consumers is more generic drug 
alternatives in the marketplace; ideally more choices mean lower prices for 
consumers.47
III. OVERVIEW OF THE FDA APPROVAL PROCESS FOR PRESCRIPTION 
DRUGS 
In order to grasp the implications of the safe harbor on the 
pharmaceutical industry, it is important to understand the regulatory 
process for drug approval post-Hatch-Waxman. The FDA48 approval 
manufacturers and generic manufacturers and the desire for increased generic competition); Michael 
Waldholz, Price of Prescription Drugs Soar After Years of Moderate Increases, WALL ST. J., May 25, 
1984, at 31 (stating customers are dissatisfied due to the increased cost of prescription drugs). 
 44. The benefits designed for the generic manufacturer are shared indirectly with the consumer. 
As ANDAs and the safe harbor allow generic manufacturers to enter the market immediately after a 
pioneer drug patent expires, consumers will have greater access and choice among medications (they 
can choose between a high-price or low-price product). As more drugs are on the market, the generic 
drugs will provide a less expensive alternative for consumers. David A. Balto & James F. Mongoven, 
Antitrust Enforcement in Pharmaceutical Industry Mergers, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 255, 259 (1999) 
(stating that FTC investigations have found “a significant price difference between generic and brand 
name versions” of a drug). See Brian Urevig, Note, Hatch-Waxman—Thoughtful Planning or Just 
Piling On: A Consideration of the Federal Trade Commission’s Proposed Changes, 4 MINN. INTELL. 
PROP. REV. 367, 390 (2003) (stating that “[g]enerics are certainly cheaper than brand-name drugs”); 
see also supra note 43 (discussing the consumer benefit of Hatch-Waxman). 
 45. See infra note 59 and accompanying text. Hatch-Waxman requires all holders of approved 
New Drug Applications (“NDAs”) to notify the FDA if an approved product is covered by patents 
claiming the product. Jeffrey I.D. Lewis, Declaratory Judgments of Patent Infringement: What They 
Forgot About Drug Applications, 7 FED. CIR. B.J. 35, 41 (1997). The FDA then publishes a 
compilation of patents covering approved products in “The Approved Prescription Drug Product List,” 
also known as the Orange Book. Id. Any manufacturer wanting to utilize an ANDA must include a 
certification with the ANDA that the patent information in the Orange Book does not bar FDA 
approval of a generic version of the patented drug. Id. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)-(c) (discussing the 
Orange Book and the ANDA certification process). See generally Shashank Upadyhe, Understanding 
Patent Infringement Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e): The Collisions Between Patent, Medical Device and 
Drug Laws, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 48–49 (2000) (discussing ANDAs, 
certification, and the Orange Book); Jacob S. Wharton, “Orange Book” Listing of Patents Under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1027 (2003) (discussing the Orange Book and its 
relationship to the FDA approval process under Hatch-Waxman). 
 46. Jones, supra note 41, at 478–79 (describing the provision as allowing generic competition to 
enter the market the day after the pioneer’s patent term expires); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). 
 47. See supra notes 43–45. 
 48. In 1938, Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to regulate the safety 
of pharmaceuticals, which led to the establishment of the FDA. Vivian I. Orlando, The FDA’s 
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process for new drugs begins when the sponsor of a new drug submits an 
Investigational New Drug Application (“IND”) to the FDA.49 If the FDA 
determines it is safe to move forward, the drug sponsor will begin Phase 
One clinical trials.50 At the end of Phase Three studies, a drug sponsor can 
file a New Drug Application (“NDA”) and ask the FDA to consider the 
drug for marketing in the United States.51 An FDA review team52 then 
reviews the NDA to evaluate the sponsor’s research on safety and 
effectiveness.53 Next, the FDA will review the information on the drug’s 
label, including the usage instructions, and it will inspect the drug 
manufacturing facilities.54 Finally, the FDA reviewers will either approve 
the drug, find it “approvable,” or find it “not approvable.”55  
Accelerated Approval Process: Does the Pharmaceutical Industry Have Adequate Incentives for Self-
Regulation?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 543, 543 (1999). See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 
U.S.C. § 301 (2000) (the basic food and drug law of the United States); see also 21 U.S.C. § 393(b) 
(2000) (codifying the FDA and articulating its function, mission, and responsibilities). 
 49. Michelle Meadows, The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs are Safe and 
Effective, FDA CONSUMER, July–Aug. 2002, at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2002/402_drug.html 
[hereinafter FDA Drug Review]. The IND must contain information on animal and toxicology studies, 
manufacturing information, clinical protocols and investigator information. Ctr. for Drug Eval. & 
Research, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Investigational New Drug (IND) Application Process, at 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/applications/ind_page_1.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2004) 
(discussing the applicable provisions in the Code of Federal Regulations, 21 C.F.R. §§ 312, 314 
(2003)) [hereinafter CDER]. 
 50. FDA Drug Review, supra note 49, states that a drug must successively pass through four 
phases of clinical trials before the drug can be considered for marketing in the United States: (1) Phase 
One studies are conducted on healthy volunteers with the goal of determining the drug’s most frequent 
side effects and how the drug is metabolized; (2) Phase Two studies emphasize effectiveness with the 
goal of determining whether the drug works in people with certain diseases and conditions; (3) Phase 
Three studies “gather more information about safety and effectiveness” focusing on different dosages, 
while monitoring drug interaction when used in combination with other drugs; (4) Phase Four studies 
occur after a drug is approved and explore long-term effects, new uses, and participant responses to 
different doses. Id. Cf. Orlando, supra note 48, at 547 (describing the Accelerated Approval 
Exemption as allowing pharmaceutical companies to provide terminally ill patients with potentially 
life-saving medication, usually after Phase One, before the drug has completed all of the mandatory 
phases of FDA clinical trials). 
 51. FDA Drug Review, supra note 49. This is the formal step for asking the FDA to approve a 
drug. Id. When a NDA is submitted, the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) 
reviews the NDA no later than ten months after receiving it. Id. 
 52. Id. (the review team consists of medical doctors, chemists, statisticians, microbiologists, 
pharmacologists, and other experts). Each reviewer prepares a report that is considered by team 
leaders, division directors, or office directors, depending on the type of application. Id. Also, the FDA 
can call on advisory committees made up of outside experts to assist with drug application decisions. 
Id.  
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. See Marian Segal, FDA Consumer Report on New Drug Development in the United 
States, An Inside Look at FDA On-Site, (Jan. 1995), at http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/whatwedo/ 
testtube-7.pdf (stating that an inspection can last from two days to several weeks depending on its 
purpose and scope). Generally, there are three types of inspections: preapproval, postapproval, and 
good manufacturing practice (“GMP”) inspections. Id. After a drug is approved, the FDA conducts a 
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Brand-name drugs are frequently under patent protection while they are 
being reviewed for FDA approval.56 When preparing to market a brand-
name drug, generic or non-pioneering manufacturers can submit an 
application to the FDA to sell generic versions57 of the drug.58 Instead of 
filing an NDA, generic manufacturers may file an ANDA,59 which utilizes 
the preclinical (animal) and clinical (human) data from the pioneer 
manufacturer’s studies, to establish safety and efficacy.60 Thus, instead of 
submitting information duplicating the lengthy clinical trials already 
conducted by the pioneer company, generic applicants must simply 
demonstrate that the generic drug is the bioequivalent to the previously 
approved drug.61 In other words, the generic drug performs the same 
function as the pioneer drug. 
postapproval inspection to validate that the firm can consistently manufacture a drug product “within 
tight parameters from batch to batch, day to day, year to year.” Id. The investigators also verify that 
the firm has not altered its “manufacturing, labeling, or quality control testing” for a specified drug. Id. 
GMP inspections are “routine” inspections that, unlike the pre- and postapproval inspections, are not 
product-specific and involve a comprehensive review of the firm’s manufacturing operations. Id. 
 55. FDA Drug Review, supra note 49. If the FDA determines that the benefits of a drug outweigh 
the risks, the drug will be approved and can be marketed in the United States. Id. “Approvable” means 
that a drug can probably be approved if some issues are resolved first. Id. “Not Approvable” is utilized 
when there are deficiencies significant enough that it is not clear whether approval can be obtained in 
the future. Id. 
 56. Ctr. for Drug Eval. & Research, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Drug Approval Application 
Process, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/applications/default.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2004). 
 57. A generic drug is one that is a bioequivalent to the patented or pioneering drug product in 
“dosage, form, safety, strength, route of administration, quality, performance characteristics and 
intended use.” Ctr. for Drug Eval. & Research, U.S. Food And Drug Admin., Office of Generic Drugs, 
at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ogd (last visited Oct. 16, 2004) [hereinafter OGD]; see also Justina A. 
Molzon, The Generic Drug Approval Process, 5 J. PHARMACY & L. 275 (1995) (comparing the 
generic drug approval process with the brand name approval process). 
 58. CDER, supra note 49. 
 59. ANDAs “are termed ‘abbreviated’ because they are generally not required to include 
preclinical (animal) and clinical (human) data to establish safety and effectiveness.” Ctr. for Drug 
Eval. & Research, U.S. Food And Drug Admin., Abbreviated New Drug Application Process (ANDA) 
for General Drugs, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/applications/ANDA.htm (last visited Oct. 
16, 2004). 
 By allowing ANDAs to be used for drugs patented after 1962, Hatch-Waxman stimulated generic 
drug development. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000) & 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000)). 
 60. OGD, supra note 57. 
 61. Id. This helps to minimize or eliminate the de facto extension of patent rights that 
pharmaceutical patent holders previously enjoyed and enhances public access to generic drugs. See 
supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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IV. INTEGRA BACKGROUND 
When a drug manufacturer seeks protection under the safe harbor after 
being accused of patent infringement, the manufacturer will likely assert 
that its activities were related to the FDA approval process and are, 
therefore, protected under the safe harbor. This is the defense Merck 
asserted in Integra.62 The plaintiff, Integra, owned five patents63 related to 
a short tri-peptide segment of fibronectin64 (“RGD peptide”) that was 
shown to attach to receptors65 on the cell surface and stimulate 
angiogenesis.66 The defendant, Merck, hired Scripps and Dr. David 
Cheresh to research and “identify potential drug candidates that might 
inhibit angiogenesis.”67 Dr. Cheresh68 was the scientist who discovered 
that blocking the same cell receptors that the RGD peptide stimulates 
inhibits angiogenesis.69 That discovery led to the discovery of EMD 
 62. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. 
granted, 73 U.S.L.W. 3059 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2005) (No. 03-1237) (“Merck answered that its work with 
Scripps falls under the safe harbor afforded by 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).”). 
 63. U.S. Patent No. 4,789,734 (issued Dec. 6, 1988); U.S. Patent No. 4,792,525 (issued Dec. 20, 
1988); U.S. Patent No. 4,879,237 (issued Nov. 7, 1989); U.S. Patent No. 5,965,997 (issued Oct. 12, 
1999); U.S. Patent No. 4,988,621 (issued Jan. 29, 1991) (held to be invalid in Integra, 331 F.3d. at 
862). 
 64. 331 F.3d at 862. It is called the “RGD peptide” because it has the amino acid sequence Arg-
Gly-Asp. Id. All proteins can be thought of as a polymer of amino acids. GEOFFREY L. ZUBAY, 
BIOCHEMISTRY 60 (Ron Worthington ed., Wm. C. Brown Publishers 4th ed. 1998). There are 20 
common amino acids, of which Arg is the abbreviation for Arginine, Gly is the abbreviation for 
Glycine, and Asp is the abbreviation for Aspartic Acid. Id. at 60–62. Structurally, amino acids have 
common features that allow them to be linked together (like the Integra “RGD peptide”). Id. at 60. 
 65. αvβ3 receptors are located on the surface of cells. 331 F.3d at 863. A receptor is “[a] 
structural protein molecule on the cell surface or within the cytoplasm that binds to a specific factor, 
such as a drug, hormone, antigen, or neurotransmitter.” STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1529 (27th 
ed. 2000). 
 66. Angiogenesis refers to the development of new blood vessels. STEDMAN’S MEDICAL 
DICTIONARY, supra note 65, at 81. Angiogenesis is controlled by “chemicals produced in the body” 
that “stimulate cells to repair damaged blood vessels or form new ones.” NATIONAL CANCER 
INSTITUTE, Cancer Facts: Angiogenesis Inhibitors in the Treatment of Cancer, at 
http://cis.nci.nih.gov/fact/ 7_42.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2004). Angiogenesis is an important factor in 
the proliferation of cancer as new blood vessels supply cancer cells with oxygen and nutrients, 
allowing the cells to grow, or metastasize. Id. 
 67. Merck entered into an agreement with Scripps to “fund ‘the necessary experiments to satisfy 
the biological basis and regulatory (FDA) requirements for the implementation of clinical trials.’” 331 
F.3d at 863. Scripps refers to The Scripps Research Institute, “one of the country’s largest, private, 
non-profit research organizations . . . .” See The Scripps Research Institute, About TSRI, at 
http://www.scripps.edu/intro/intro.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2005); see also 331 F.3d at 860 (naming 
The Scripps Research Institute as a defendant). 
 68. Dr. Cheresh was a scientist at Scripps. 331 F.3d at 863. 
 69. Id. Antiangiogenic therapies show promise as a means to slow tumor growth by starving 
rapidly dividing cells (such as cancer), and to “treat diabetic retinopathy, rheumatoid arthritis, 
psoriasis, and inflammatory bowel disease.” Id. The American Cancer Society describes 
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121974, which was selected for clinical development.70 Upon learning of 
the Scripps-Merck research, Integra offered Merck licenses to the RGD-
related patents because it believed that the anti-angiogenesis research was 
a commercial project that infringed its RGD peptide patents.71 Merck 
declined the Scripps license, claiming that its work was related to the FDA 
approval process and consequently fell within the Hatch-Waxman safe 
harbor.72
In response, Integra filed suit against Merck alleging patent 
infringement of its RGD-related patents.73 At trial, the district court found 
Merck liable for patent infringement on four of the five patents belonging 
to Integra and held that Merck’s activity was not protected by the Hatch-
Waxman safe harbor.74 Merck filed motions for judgment as a matter of 
law before and after jury deliberations asserting, inter alia, that its actions 
were protected by the safe harbor.75 The district court denied Merck’s 
motions,76 and Merck appealed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit affirmed the narrow scope of the safe harbor, holding 
that the safe harbor “does not reach any exploratory research that may 
rationally form a predicate for future FDA clinical tests”77 and that 
Merck’s biomedical experimentation, which may be subject to FDA 
approval at some time, was not protected by the safe harbor.78  
V. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT OF THE SAFE HARBOR’S SCOPE 
When enacting the Hatch-Waxman safe harbor, Congress’s main 
purpose was to overrule Roche v. Bolar79 and stimulate the generic drug 
antiangiogenesis therapy as “promising,” and suggests that studies have shown that the antiangiogenic 
drugs may be able to fight cancer while causing fewer side effects than treatments currently in use. 
AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, Antiangiogenesis Therapy, at http://www.cancer.org/docroot/ETO/ 
content/ETO_1_4x_Introduction_Antiangiogenesis_Therapy.asp?sitearea=ETO (last visited Jan. 25, 
2004). 
 70. 331 F.3d at 863. Scripps’ research led to the discovery of EMD 85189, which lead to the 
development of EMD 121974. Id. Tests to assess the toxicology, circulation, diffusion, histopathology, 
half-life, and proper mode of administration lead the Scripps research team to choose EMD 121974 for 
development. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. Merck declined the licenses after lengthy negotiations with Integra. Id.  
 73. Id. at 862. 
 74. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd v. Merck KGaA, No. 96-CV-1307, 1999 WL 398180 (S.D. Cal. 
Feb. 9, 1999). The court also found that Merck owed Integra $15 million. Id.  
 75. 331 F.3d at 864. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 867. 
 78. Id. at 868.  
 79. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See Brian D. Coggio & F. Dominic Cerrito, The Safe Harbor 
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industry by allowing generic manufacturers to perform the FDA required 
bioequivalency testing80 before a brand-name patent expired.81 It seems 
that the congressional intent was to exclude the testing of a drug, solely for 
the purpose of submitting data to the FDA, from patent infringement 
liability.82 However, the language of the statute has left many courts 
struggling to determine the scope83 of the safe harbor, which has led to a 
very broad application of this infringement defense.84 By applying the safe 
harbor broadly to biotechnology, the integrity of the biotechnology 
industry’s intellectual property is threatened.85  
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.86 the Supreme Court provided the 
foundation for a broad interpretation of the safe harbor’s scope. The issue 
Provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act: Present Scope, New Possibilities, and International 
Considerations, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 161, 162 (2002) (stating Congress’s main purpose was to 
overrule Roche v. Bolar); Jones, supra note 41, at 478–79 (stating that the safe harbor was a legislative 
overrule to the Roche decision); see also Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 27, at 604–05 (discussing 
Hatch-Waxman’s reversal of the Federal Circuit’s Roche decision). 
 80. The House Committee initiating the safe harbor defined the pre-market approval activities 
allowed by the safe harbor as “a limited amount of testing so that generic manufacturers can establish 
the bioequivalency of a generic substitute.” H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 8 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2692. Bioequivalency is defined in H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 31 (1984), 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2664 as: 
A drug shall be considered bioequivalent to a listed drug if the rate and extent of absorption 
of the generic drug do not show a significant difference from the rate and extent of absorption 
of the listed drug when administered at the same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient 
under similar experimental conditions in either a single dose or multiple doses. 
Id. 
 81. Coggio & Cerrito, supra note 79, at 162 (stating Congress wanted to immunize the 
bioequivalency testing needed by generic manufacturers to secure FDA approval). See Soehnge, supra 
note 35, at 53, 56–58 (discussing Congress’s intent to balance the competing interests of generic and 
pioneer drug manufacturers); see also Robinson, supra note 35, at 50–56 (discussing the objectives of 
Congress when it created the safe harbor). 
 82. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 30 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2714 
(stating “all that the generic can do is to test the drug for purposes of submitting data to the FDA for 
approval”). 
 83. Coggio & Cerrito, supra note 79, at 162 (stating that recent cases are still trying to decipher 
the scope of the safe harbor provision); Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 27, at 606 (stating an area of 
controversy is the scope of activities covered by the safe harbor). See infra note 84 and accompanying 
text.  
 84. Coggio & Cerrito, supra note 79, at 162 (stating that section 271(e)(1) protection has been 
construed very broadly); see also William Feiler & Paula Wittmayer, Expanding Exemptions for 
Generics, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., June 1, 2003, at 46 (stating that the scope of the provision has 
been expanded); Paul Fehlner, Not Such a Safe Harbor After All, 10 INTELL. PROP. LITIG. REP. 18 
(2003) (describing the broad expansion of the safe harbor); Eric K. Steffe & Timothy J. Shea, Jr., Drug 
Discovery Tools and the Clinical Research Exemption from Patent Infringement, 22 BIOTECHNOLOGY 
L. REP. 369, 370–71 (2003) (describing the uncertainty in applying the safe harbor and the broadening 
of its scope). 
 85. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
 86. 496 U.S. 661 (1990).  
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before the Court was whether the safe harbor was limited only to drugs.87 
The Court determined that the safe harbor afforded protection to the pre-
market development of medical devices as well as drugs.88 The Court 
conceded that the legislative history did not clearly support its 
interpretation.89 However, based on the construction of the statute,90 the 
majority reasoned that Congress did not intend the safe harbor to be 
limited only to drugs.91 Furthermore, the Court asserted that Congress 
created section 15692 to allow a patent extension for inventions subject to a 
lengthy regulatory approval process. Because the safe harbor is the 
counterbalance to that provision,93 it seems “implausible” that Congress 
would have intended the safe harbor to apply only to drugs when medical 
devices are also subject to the same lengthy regulatory approval.94 
Accordingly, the Court held that the clinical trial exception of the Hatch-
Waxman safe harbor also applies to medical devices that are subject to 
FDA approval.95  
 87. Id. at 663–64. Specifically, the controversy concerned whether the statutory phrase, “a 
Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs,” refers “only to those individual 
provisions of federal law that regulate drugs” or “to the entirety of any Act . . . at least some of whose 
provisions regulate drugs.” Id. at 665–66. 
 88. Id. at 669. 
 89. Id. (stating that while both parties to the litigation attempt to enlist the legislative history to 
buttress their interpretation of the statute, the history “sheds no clear light” to support either 
interpretation). 
 90. Id. at 666–67 (discussing Congress’s word choice in constructing various phrases of the 
statute). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 93. See supra notes 27, 35 and accompanying text.  
 94. 496 U.S. at 672–73. Referring to the balancing of interests attempted by the Hatch-Waxman 
provisions, the Court stated: 
It seems most implausible to us that Congress, being demonstrably aware of the dual 
distorting effects of regulatory approval requirements in this entire area—dual distorting 
effects that were roughly offsetting, the disadvantage at the beginning of the term producing a 
more or less corresponding advantage at the end of the term—should choose to address both 
those distortions only for drug products; and for other products named in § 201 [which 
created § 156] should enact provisions which not only leave in place an anticompetitive 
restriction at the end of the monopoly term but simultaneously expand the monopoly term 
itself, thereby not only failing to eliminate but positively aggravating distortion of the 17-year 
patent protection. It would take strong evidence to persuade us that this is what Congress 
wrought, and there is no such evidence here. 
Id. 
 95. Id. at 679. The Court held that section 271(e)(1) is to be read in conjunction with 35 U.S.C. 
§ 156. Id. at 669–74. Also, the Court stated that the safe harbor only applies to those patents subject to 
a regulatory review process identified in subsections 156(a)(4) and (5). Id. at 674 n.6. This includes: 
new drugs, veterinary biological products, and methods of manufacturing a product using recombinant 
DNA technology. 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4)–(5) (2000). 
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The dissent in Eli Lilly96 underscores the conflict inherent in 
determining the scope of the safe harbor. The minority finds persuasive 
the statutory interpretation that affords infringement protection only to 
drugs.97 The dissent takes issue with the majority’s interpretation of the 
statute in reaching its decision;98 criticizing the implication of 
congressional intent asserted by the majority.99  
Struggling to determine what was protected under the safe harbor, the 
district court for the Northern District of California, in Intermedics Inc. v. 
Ventritex, Inc.,100 created a two-prong test.101 The district court’s test, cited 
with approval by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,102 
determined that an infringing medical device maker was protected under 
the safe harbor if the infringer used clinical trial data to solicit investment 
capital.103 Rejecting a narrow interpretation of the safe harbor, the district 
court reasoned that Congress intended the statute to be read broadly104 to 
 96. The decision was a 6–2 split with Justice O’Connor taking no part in consideration of the 
case. Id. at 662. Justice Kennedy wrote the dissent, joined by Justice White. Id. at 679. 
 97. Id. at 680 (stating that section 271(e)(1) does not privilege the pre-market testing of medical 
devices). Justice Kennedy stated, “[w]hen § 271(e)(1) speaks of a law which regulates drugs, I think 
that it does not refer to particular enactments or implicate the regulation of anything other than drugs.” 
Id. Justice Kennedy also stated that the safe harbor “refers only to the actual regulation of drugs, and 
does not exempt the testing of a medical device from patent infringement.” Id. at 682. 
 98. Id. at 680–81. Justice Kennedy criticized the implied meaning given to the safe harbor by the 
majority stating that “[n]umerous statutory provisions and court decisions, from a variety of 
jurisdictions, use words almost identical to those of § 271(e)(1), and they never mean what the Court 
says they mean here.” Id. at 680. Justice Kennedy explained: 
For instance, in delineating the scope of pre-emption by the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Congress stated that “nothing in this title shall be construed to 
exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, 
or securities.” 88 Stat. 897, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Interpreting this 
language as the Court interprets § 271(e)(1) would imply that Congress intended to give the 
States a free hand to enact any law that conflicts with ERISA so long as some portion of the 
state enactment regulates insurance, banking, or securities. No one would contend for this 
result. 
Id. at 681. 
 99. Id. at 680 (stating that the Court cannot tell Congress how to express its intent). Justice 
Kennedy stated that intent should be discerned by assuming that “Congress employs words and 
phrases in accordance with their ordinary usage.” Id. 
 100. 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
 101. Id. at 1280. 
 102. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1525 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 
1992). 
 103. 775 F. Supp. at 1281. 
 104. 775 F. Supp. at 1279 (stating that “business purposes” are the type of infringing activities that 
the statute “clearly covers” and “Congress could not have intended the exemption to apply only to 
those whose purposes were purely scientific, or to those who were motivated simply by a driving 
curiosity”). In support of commercial coverage under the safe harbor, the court reasoned: 
We believe that in enacting this exemption Congress clearly decided that it wanted potential 
competitors to be able to ready themselves, fully, during the life of the patent, to enter the 
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allow competition, and the courts should use their discretion in 
determining whether potentially infringing activities are protected by the 
safe harbor.105 Thus, infringing commercial activities qualified for safe 
harbor protection even though the accused activities were not related to the 
FDA approval process.106
Intermedics analysis requires that: (1) only infringing uses be analyzed 
under the safe harbor, and (2) exemption is available only for those 
infringing activities “reasonably related” to the development and 
submission of information to the FDA.107 After Intermedics, an infringing 
activity is exempt if it would have been reasonable for a party to believe 
there was a prospect that the use in question would generate data that may 
be relevant in the FDA approval process.108  
Perhaps believing that the safe harbor scope was ballooning through 
misinterpretation by the courts,109 the district court for the Western District 
of Wisconsin sought to temper the amount of protection allowed by the 
safe harbor in Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Technology, Inc.110 Here, 
defendant Advanced Cell Technology infringed a patent owned by Infigen 
that covered a process for activating bovine oocytes111 (unfertilized eggs) 
commercial marketplace in a large scale way as soon as the relevant patents expired . . . [to 
give] the public prompt access to new medical products at the lowest commercially feasible 
prices. 
Id. at 1277. 
 105. Id. at 1280 (“Congress [phrased the statute] to communicate its intention that the courts give 
parties some latitude in making judgments about the nature and extent of the otherwise infringing 
activities they would engage in as they sought to develop information to satisfy the FDA.”).  
 106. Although using clinical trial data to solicit investment capital is not directly related to 
establishing bioequivalency through the FDA process, the court exercised its power to construe the 
safe harbor broadly and viewed the capital solicitation activities as being “reasonably related” to the 
FDA approval process. Id. (stating that the phrase “‘reasonably related’ reflects Congress’s 
acknowledgement that it will not always be clear to parties setting out to seek FDA approval for their 
new product exactly which kinds of information . . . it will take to win the agency’s approval.”). 
 107. Id.; see also Feiler & Wittmayer, supra note 84, at 48–49 (describing the two-prong analysis 
of the Intermedics court). 
 108. 775 F. Supp. at 1280. Acts are covered under the safe harbor if the party could reasonably 
“believe that there was a decent prospect that the ‘use’ in question would contribute (relatively 
directly) to the generation of kinds of information that was likely to be relevant in the processes by 
which the FDA would decide whether to approve the product.” Id. 
 109. The District Court of Massachusetts also read the safe harbor language broadly and held that 
a competitor who infringed a patent and conducted testing primarily for commercial purposes was 
protected under the safe harbor because some of the resulting data was “reasonably related” to the 
FDA approval process. Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 888 F. Supp. 6, 8 (D. Mass. 1995). The court held 
that an infringer’s ulterior motives were irrelevant to its ability to invoke protection of the safe harbor. 
Feiler & Wittmayer, supra note 83, at 48, 50. 
 110. 65 F. Supp.2d 967 (W.D. Wis. 1999). 
 111. The technology at issue involves the cloning of transgenic cattle. Id. at 970. “A transgenic 
cow is one that has had DNA introduced artificially into one or more of its cells. The value of such a 
cow is that it is capable of producing a transgene product, that is, one not naturally present in cattle, 
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used in cloning transgenic cattle for commercial purposes.112 The court 
considered whether the infringing company’s use of the patented process 
for preclinical activities, such as drug development, was protected under 
the safe harbor.113 The court looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in Eli 
Lilly and determined that the safe harbor is to be read in conjunction with 
section 156.114 The court held that the safe harbor is only applicable to 
infringing activities on patents that are identified as being subject to 
regulatory approval in 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4) and (5) and, because the 
patent at issue is not identified in section 156, the safe harbor does not 
apply.115 The Infigen court refused to apply the infringement exemption to 
a research process116 and did not read the safe harbor as loosely as the 
Intermedics court. However, the narrow interpretation of the safe harbor 
by the Infigen court has largely been ignored.117
The protection for infringement liability under the safe harbor 
continued to expand in Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.118 
The issue presented to the Amgen court originated in Intermedics; at issue 
was whether safe harbor protection is intended for infringement of a drug 
patent for purposes that may be related to FDA approval but where the 
patent is infringed for other ulterior purposes.119 Amgen owned several 
patents covering a genetically engineered (recombinant) form of 
erythropoietin (“EPO”), a hormone that stimulates the production of red 
blood cells.120 Amgen’s EPO patents were allegedly infringed by Hoechst 
in a variety of ways for regulatory and commercial reasons.121 Reaffirming 
the Intermedics logic, the court held that the infringers were protected 
such as a pharmaceutical drug.” Id.  
 112. Id. at 973–74. 
 113. Id. at 980. 
 114. Id. at 979–80. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.  
 115. 65 F. Supp.2d at 980 (stating that “Eli Lilly makes clear, the patent extension is the quid pro 
quo for the protection from infringement actions and vice versa.”). 
 116. Id. (“My own research shows no cases granting the § 271(e)(1) exemption from the otherwise 
infringing use of any product other than those drugs, medical devices, food and color additives defined 
specified in § 156.”). 
 117. See Feiler & Wittmayer, supra note 84, at 48 (stating that the Infigen decision is contrary to 
the Court of Appeals in Abtox and had the parties not settled, the decision likely would have been 
reversed on appeal). 
 118. 3 F. Supp.2d 104 (D. Mass. 1998).  
 119. Id. at 107–08. 
 120. Id. at 106. Erythropoietin “is used in the treatment of anemia, particularly in patients 
suffering chronic renal failure.” Id. 
 121. Id. at 108–11 (identifying six potentially infringing activities: export to Japan, rabbit pyrogen 
studies, consistency batches, characterization of the generic (competing) product, viral clearing tests 
designed to meet European regulatory standards, and radiolabeling).  
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under the safe harbor.122 Here, the court allowed ulterior uses that may be 
related to FDA approval, but are utilized for purposes other than obtaining 
FDA approval, to be protected.123  
The judicial expansion of the possible acts or “uses” that are protected 
under the safe harbor led the court in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,124 to consider whether the safe harbor applied to all 
activities “reasonably related” to an actual or possible FDA application 
from the very first synthesis of an intermediate compound (i.e., research 
tool).125  
Essentially, the court had to determine how far down the research chain 
in the drug discovery process the safe harbor exemption would reach.126 
Here, Bristol used some of Rhone’s patented intermediates (i.e., research 
tools)127 to further its own research into taxol analogs (generic versions of 
a brand-name drug).128 Rhone claimed that “Bristol’s use of the patented 
intermediates is outside the scope of Section 271(e)(1) because 1) the 
intermediates are not a ‘patented invention’ within the meaning of that 
 122. Id. at 113 (stating that the defendants’ activities fell within the safe harbor exemption).  
 123. Id. at 107–08 (stating uses that may be related to FDA approval yet conducted for other 
purposes are not precluded from the safe harbor exemption because the Federal Circuit precedents 
indicate that such ulterior motives are allowed). The court, following Intermedics, held “In order to 
come within protection of section 271(e)(1), the Defendants thus must make, use, or sell the patented 
invention in ways that objectively bear reasonable prospects of yielding information that might be 
relevant in the FDA approval process.” Id. at 108. (emphasis added). 
 The court’s broad language expanded the types of activities that are “reasonably related” to FDA 
approval and thus subject to exemption under the safe harbor. 
 124. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19361 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2001).  
 125. Id. at **4–5 (framing the issue in terms of using drug “intermediates”). Intermediate 
compounds can be considered research tools because they can be used to synthesize other drugs, drug 
precursors, or drug analogs. Id. at *3. The National Institute of Health (“NIH”) uses “the term 
‘research tool’ in its broadest sense to embrace the full range of resources that scientists use in the 
laboratory, while recognizing that from other perspectives the same resources may be viewed as ‘end 
products.’” Report of the National Institute of Health (NIH) Working Group on Research Tools, 
presented to the Advisory Committee to the Director on June 4, 1998, at 3, at http://www.nih.gov/ 
news/researchtools/index.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2004); see also Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante 
Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research 
Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 10–17 (2001) (describing research tools); Natalie M. Derzko, In Search of 
a Compromised Solution to the Problem Arising from Patenting Biomedical Research Tools, 20 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 347, 348–53 (2004) (describing research tools and their 
potential uses). 
 126. Steffe & Shea, supra note 84, at 371 (framing the issue of the Bristol court). 
 127. 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19361, at *3 (the research tool patent discloses and claims semi-
synthetic processes for preparing taxol (“paclitaxel”) and four intermediates obtained and used during 
research). 
 128. Id. at *4. “Bristol embarked on a taxane research and development program in an attempt to 
discover a new, more active drug that could replace taxol as the preeminent anti-cancer drug” when the 
taxol patent expired. Id. at *14. 
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term in Section 271(e)(1) and 2) Bristol’s uses were not ‘reasonably 
related’ to the [FDA approval process].”129  
The court held that the language of Hatch-Waxman does not indicate 
that Congress intended to restrict the safe harbor only to products covered 
under 35 U.S.C. § 156.130 After determining that a research tool is a 
patented invention within the meaning of the safe harbor,131 the court held 
that Bristol’s experiments using Rhone’s research tools were “reasonably 
related” to the submission of information to the FDA, and thus exempt 
from patent infringement liability.132 After Bristol, research tools and other 
drug analogs appeared to be within the scope of the Hatch-Waxman safe 
harbor, in effect, pushing the safe harbor protection afforded patent 
infringers further down the research chain and eviscerating the value of 
many research tool patents.133
Essentially, the court decisions before Integra encouraged companies 
to discount or ignore the value of research tool patents as long as the 
infringing company was working to develop a new drug.134 Following 
Bristol, the level of protection afforded biotechnology intellectual property 
was uncertain; the expanded liability shield protecting infringers and the 
uncertainty surrounding the scope of the safe harbor seemed poised to 
have detrimental effects on the biotechnology industry.135 Biotechnology 
 129. Id. at *5. 
 130. Id. at *6. In support of its interpretation, the court noted, “[d]espite the broad scope of the 
language used in Section 271(e)(1) having been expressly brought to the attention of members of 
Congress, no attempt was made to refine or narrow the language used in the text of Section 271(e)(1).” 
Id. at *10 n.6. 
 131. Id. at *9 (holding that the patented intermediates come within the meaning of section 
271(e)(1)).  
 132. Id. at **19–20. The court reasoned: 
A rational jury could only conclude based on these undisputed facts that it was reasonable, 
objectively, for a party in Bristol’s position to believe that there was a “decent prospect” that 
its use of the RPR [Rhone] intermediates in Bristol’s experiments “would contribute 
(relatively directly) to the generation of kinds of information that was likely to be relevant in 
the process by which the FDA would decide whether to approve the product.” Intermedics, 
775 F. Supp. at 1280. Accordingly, Bristol’s experiments with the RPR patented 
intermediates are entitled to the exemption Congress provided in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) . . . . 
Id. 
 133. Feiler & Wittmayer, supra note 84, at 50; Steffe & Shea, supra note 84, at 371–75. 
 134. Stephen B. Maebius & Richard J. Warburg, Federal Circuit Reins in Free Use of Patented 
Research Tools, LEGAL TIMES IP MAGAZINE, July 21, 2003, at 9; see also Weiswasser & Danzis, 
supra note 27, at 606 (discussing the controversy surrounding the scope of what is “reasonably 
related” to FDA approval and broad construction by the courts). 
 135. See Steffe & Shea, supra note 84, at 372–73 (stating that “[n]umerous biotechnology 
companies have been formed on the basis of a drug discovery platform as the core technology”); 
Groombridge & Calabro, supra note 33, at 462 (stating “many commentators felt that the trend in the 
recent case law was undermining the value of biotechnology patents”). Cf. Linda R. Judge, 
Biotechnology: Highlights of the Science and Law Shaping the Industry, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER 
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companies that have research tools as their primary assets rely on stringent 
patent protection for conducting business essential to the firm’s 
survival.136 As such, the Bristol decision left commentators from the patent 
bar to contemplate the decision’s effect on the biotechnology market, 
saying it would “open[] up the floodgates for free use of patented 
chemicals and methods by any company developing drugs for sale in the 
American market.”137  
VI. INTEGRA NARROWS THE SAFE HARBOR 
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA,138 presented the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with the challenges of interpreting the 
scope of the Hatch-Waxman Act and of determining whether the safe 
harbor “reaches back down the chain of experimentation to embrace 
development and identification of new drugs that will, in turn, be subject 
to FDA approval.”139 The court held that Congress only intended to benefit 
generic drug makers;140 yet, because the court had considered the 
limitations of the statutory language before, it followed Eli Lilly and 
Intermedics in allowing clinical trials and demonstrations of medical 
devices to be protected under the safe harbor.141
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 79, 85 (2003) (stating “[t]he protection afforded by the patent statutes and federal 
case law interpreting those statutes, together with legislation which provides favorable incentives to 
patenting biotechnology-based inventions, have contributed to the leading position of the United States 
in the biotechnology industry worldwide.”). For a discussion of biotechnology industry developments 
and the corresponding patent law changes, see id. 
 136. Steffe & Shea, supra note 84, at 374 (stating “emerging companies having research tools as 
their primary assets . . . view patents . . . as being critical for raising venture capital . . . [and] necessary 
to leverage alliances with other companies”). 
 137. Groombridge & Calabro, supra note 33, at 467 (citing Warburg & Maebius, supra note 11, at 
26); see also Steffe & Shea, supra note 84, at 375 (stating that adopting the rule set forth by the district 
court in Bristol would leave drug discovery tool patent owners “with little recourse when attempting to 
assert their patent rights against competitors”). Under the Bristol ruling, “the value of drug discovery 
tool patents [is being] diluted . . . by expanding the experimental use exemption from patent 
infringement.” Id.  
 138. 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 73 U.S.L.W. 3059 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2005) (No. 03-
1237). 
 139. Id. at 865–66. The Federal Circuit also considered Merck’s claim that the district court erred 
in construing some of Integra’s patent claims and that the damages awarded Integra by the district 
court were unreasonable. Id. at 868–69. Because these issues are outside the scope of the safe harbor 
analysis in this Note, they are omitted. 
 140. Id. at 865 (relying on House Committee testimony that describes the pre-market approval 
activity allowed under the safe harbor as a limited amount of testing so as to establish bioequivalence). 
All that a generic manufacturer can do is test the drug for purposes of submitting data to the FDA for 
approval. Id. at 866. 
 141. Id. at 865 (following Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 
1991)). 
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However, the court broke from the trend of increasing infringement 
protection under the safe harbor and noticeably restricted those activities 
that may be thought of as being related to the FDA approval process.142 In 
support of its interpretation of the statute, the court focused on the term 
“solely” in the statutory language as limiting the activities that qualify for 
exemption.143 The court explained that the statutory protection extends 
only to activities that are specified in section 271(e)(1)—namely the FDA 
approval process.144 The court emphasized that the original intent of 
Congress in drafting the Hatch-Waxman safe harbor was only to allow 
activities that are “reasonably related” to the development and submission 
of FDA required safety and efficacy information.145  
The court did recognize that the term “reasonably” in the statute 
permits some otherwise unqualified activities to be exempt under the safe 
harbor.146 However, these activities strain the central purpose of the safe 
harbor—the submission of information to the FDA.147 Here, the work 
sponsored by Merck was not clinical testing for FDA safety and efficacy 
purposes, “but only general biomedical research to identify new 
pharmaceutical compounds.”148 Thus, the court held that (the safe harbor 
does not protect Merck’s general biomedical research)149 Merck’s 
activities were not “solely for uses reasonably related” to the FDA 
approval process because the FDA has no interest in the search for 
potential drugs that may undergo testing.150
The majority seemingly rejected the Intermedics and Amgen courts’ 
endorsement of ulterior motives and commercial purposes as being 
protected by the safe harbor151 by not expanding the phrase “reasonably 
 142. Id. at 866. 
 143. Id. (“The term ‘solely’ places a constraint on the inquiry into the limits of the exemption.”). 
The court notes that “[t]he exemption cannot extend at all beyond uses . . . specified in § 271(e)(1).” 
Id. (emphasis added).  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. (stating that to qualify for the exemption, an infringing activity must reasonably relate to 
the FDA’s safety and effectiveness requirement). The court states that the “expedited approval process 
requires the generic drug company to perform safety and effectiveness tests on its product before 
expiration of the patent on the pioneer drug . . . .” Id. at 867. 
 146. Id. at 866 (“The term ‘reasonably’ permits some activities that are not themselves the 
experiments that produce FDA information to qualify” for the exemption). 
 147. Id. (“The meaning of the phrase ‘reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information’ as set forth in § 271(e)(1) is clearer in the context of the role of the 1984 Act in 
facilitating expedited approval of a generic version of a drug previously approved by the FDA.”). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 868.  
 150. Id. at 866 (“The FDA has no interest in the hunt for drugs that may or may not later undergo 
clinical testing for FDA approval.”). 
 151. See supra notes 100–08, 118–23 and accompanying text. 
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related” to embrace the commercial development of new drugs that will 
eventually need FDA approval.152 To do so, the court stated, would ignore 
the language of the statute and the intent of Congress given the context in 
which the safe harbor was enacted.153  
Judge Newman disagreed with the majority, concluding that Merck’s 
actions were immune from infringement liability under either the common 
law research exemption154 or the Hatch-Waxman safe harbor.155 Judge 
Newman disagreed with the majority’s characterization of Merck’s 
research activities as “discovery-based research.”156 According to Judge 
Newman, labeling Merck’s activities as “discovery-based research” is a 
conclusion that is not required by law,157 and in doing so, the majority 
effectively misinterpreted the purpose of the patent system158 and 
 152. 331 F.3d at 867. The court states that the safe harbor “does not globally embrace all 
experimental activity that at some point, however attenuated, may lead to an FDA approval process.” 
Id.  
 153. Id. Addressing the potential impact on the biotechnology industry, the court stated: 
Extending § 271(e)(1) to embrace new drug development activities would ignore its language 
and context with respect to the 1984 Act in an attempt to exonerate infringing uses only 
potentially related to information for FDA approval. . . . [E]xaggerating § 271(e)(1) out of 
context would swallow the whole benefit of the Patent Act for some categories of 
biotechnological inventions. 
Id. 
 154. Id. at 874–75 (Newman, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 Fed. 
Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813); Sawin v. Guild, 21 Fed. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813); Chesterfield 
v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 371 (1958)). Judge Newman cited Whittemore as the origin of Justice 
Story’s common law research exemption, which states that in creating patent rights, “it could never 
have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely for 
philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce 
its described effects.” 331 F.3d at 874–75 (citing Whittemore, 29 Fed. Cas. at 1121).  
 155. 331 F.3d at 874. Judge Newman framed the question differently than the majority: “[t]he 
question is whether, and to what extent, the patentee’s permission is required in order to study that 
which is patented.” Id. at 872–73. But see supra note 139 and accompanying text (the majority’s 
framing of the issue); 331 F.3d at 863 n.2 (comparing Judge Newman’s advocacy of the common law 
experimental use exception with the issue before the jury). 
 156. Id. at 873 (stating that the panel majority held that Merck’s activities were discovery-based 
research and there is no right to conduct such research under the common law research exemption or 
section 271(e)(1)).  
 157. Id. Judge Newman stated that neither law nor policy requires the conclusion that Merck’s 
actions were not protected by the common law research exemption or the safe harbor. Id.  
 158. Id. In her dissent, Judge Newman described the purpose of the patent system: 
The purpose of a patent system is not only to provide a financial incentive to create new 
knowledge and bring it to public benefit through new products; it also serves to add to the 
body of published scientific/technologic knowledge. The requirement of disclosure of the 
details of patented inventions facilitates further knowledge and understanding of what was 
done by the patentee, and may lead to further technologic advance. The right to conduct 
research to achieve such knowledge need not, and should not, await expiration of the patent. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also infra note 195 (discussing the philosophical theories behind the U.S. 
patent system). 
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eliminated the common law research exemption.159 As such, in Judge 
Newman’s view, the refusal to recognize the common law research 
exemption cannot be squared within the framework of modern patent 
law.160 The dissent suggested that “[t]he better rule is to recognize the 
exemption for research conducted to understand or improve upon or 
modify the patented subject matter, whatever the ultimate goal.”161  
The dissent also disagreed with the majority’s refusal to grant Merck 
immunity under the safe harbor.162 Judge Newman relied on Eli Lilly as 
evidence that the statute should be read broadly163 and concluded that if 
Merck’s activities are not protected under the common law research 
exemption they are protected by the Hatch-Waxman safe harbor.164 Judge 
Newman agreed that the safe harbor does not reach “back down the chain 
of experimentation to embrace development and identification of new 
drugs;”165 however she opined that Merck’s laboratory experiments and 
development of data that would be submitted to the FDA was immune 
from infringement liability166 because holding otherwise would create a 
gray area between the common law exploratory research exemption and 
the Hatch-Waxman safe harbor.167 In conclusion, Judge Newman stated 
 159. Id. (stating that the “court disapproves and essentially eliminates the common law research 
exemption,” a change that is “ill-suited to today’s research-founded, technology-based economy”). Cf. 
Mueller, supra note 125, at 1 (advocating a broadened view of research tool use that would permit 
scientists to use certain research tools without prior authorization and pay the research tool patent 
owner based upon the commercial success of the new product); Derzko, supra note 125, at 347 
(discussing the need for research tool availability to further biomedical research). 
 160. 331 F.3d at 875 (stating that the prohibition of all research that might lead to competition or 
challenge a patented technology “cannot be squared with the framework of the patent law”). The 
dissent suggests that it is necessary for the advancement of technology that the subject matter of 
patents be studied in order to improve, find a new use for, modify or design around the patent. Id. 
 161. Id. at 876 (reasoning that “the patent is infringed by and bars activity associated with 
development and commercialization of infringing subject matter, but the research itself is not 
prohibited.”). 
 162. Id. at 877. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Judge Newman stated: “[T]he territory that the Scripps/Merck research traversed, from 
laboratory experimentation to development of data for submission to the FDA, was either exempt 
exploratory research, or was immunized by § 271(e)(1).” Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. Judge Newman disagreed with the majority’s categorization of the Integra patents as 
“research tools.” Id. at 878. She reasoned that the RGD-peptides are not a “tool” used in research, “but 
simply new compositions having certain biological properties;” thus the majority’s statement that 
“acceptance of a common law research exemption would eliminate patents on ‘research tools’” is a 
misperception. Id. at 877. Cf. supra note 125 (discussing the NIH’s use of the term “research tool”). 
Judge Newman’s narrow application of what constitutes a “research tool” differs from the NIH’s broad 
construction of “research tool.”  
 167. 331 F.3d at 877. Judge Newman stated: 
It would be strange to create an intervening kind of limbo, between exploratory research 
subject to exemption, and the FDA statutory immunity, where the patent is infringed and the 
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that the research performed by Merck was within the common law 
research exemption, and “the development shielded by § 271(e)(1) took up 
where the research exemption left off.”168  
VII. ANALYSIS: IMPACT OF THE INTEGRA DECISION  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit correctly refused to 
protect Merck from patent infringement liability under the Hatch-Waxman 
safe harbor.169 Clearly Merck’s use of Integra’s peptide sequence (the 
RGD peptide) was not for the purpose of obtaining FDA approval for a 
generic version of a pioneer drug.170 The use of Integra’s patented research 
tool to develop a new drug was not the type of protection contemplated by 
Congress when it created the safe harbor.171 Rewarding Merck with 
protection from infringement liability would have run counter to a major 
policy justification of the safe harbor: the quid pro quo exchange of 
infringement protection for prompt access to less expensive generic 
pharmaceuticals for consumers.172 Here, Merck did not have the 
immediate prospect of offering a generic version of a drug through its 
infringing activities.173 As such, Merck’s research was purely 
exploratory174 and was correctly characterized as infringing Integra’s 
patent rights.  
By focusing on statutory language,175 the Integra court attempted to 
define the limits of safe harbor protection based on congressional intent. 
The legislative history of the safe harbor indicates a desire by Congress to 
activity can be prohibited. That would defeat the purposes of both exemptions; the law does 
not favor such an illogical outcome. 
Id. 
 168. Id. at 878. 
 169. By not allowing safe harbor protection for infringement related to the development and 
identification of new drugs that will eventually be subject to FDA testing, the court avoided making a 
slippery-slope determination of what activities are for the development of new drugs versus activities 
that are aimed at FDA approval. 
 170. See supra notes 67–72, 78 and accompanying text (characterizing the nature of Merck’s use 
of the RGD-related patents); see also Integra, 331 F.3d at 866 (stating “Merck used the Integra 
inventions, and thus infringed its patents”). 
 171. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.  
 172. See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text; see also infra note 195 (describing the policy 
justifications behind U.S. patent system).  
 173. Merck was merely performing “general biomedical research.” Integra, 331 F.3d at 866; see 
also supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 174. 331 F.3d at 866 (characterizing Merck’s infringement activity as “general biomedical 
research”); see also id. at 868 (describing Merck’s infringement as “general biomedical 
experimentation”).  
 175. See supra notes 140, 143, 146, 147 and accompanying text. 
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protect only the limited activities that will allow generic manufacturers to 
establish bioequivalency.176 Following the language of Congress, the court 
limited the liability protection afforded by the safe harbor umbrella, and 
excluded experimental infringement that is not “reasonably related” to the 
submission of safety and efficacy information to the FDA.177  
However, the Integra majority failed to define exactly what activities 
are “reasonably related” to the FDA approval process.178 The failure to 
articulate a bright-line rule is unusual for the Federal Circuit.179 Contrary 
to its ruling in Integra, the Federal Circuit has a proclivity to create 
formalistic substantive rules180 under its congressional mandate to promote 
 176. During deliberation, the Committee on the Judiciary considered six amendments to the 
Hatch-Waxman legislation. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 7 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2686, 2691. In rejecting the Moorhead amendment, which would have delayed the FDA related testing 
of generic drug manufacturers, the Committee addressed Mr. Moorhead’s concerns that the bill was an 
unconstitutional taking of intellectual property without compensation: 
The only activity which will be permitted by the bill is a limited amount of testing so that 
generic manufacturers can establish the bioequivalency of a generic substitute. The patent 
holder retains the right to exclude others from the major commercial marketplace during the 
life of the patent. Thus, the nature of the interference with the rights of a patent holder is not 
substantial. 
Id. at 2692. 
 177. 331 F.3d at 866. The court stated that the safe harbor will not embrace general biomedical 
experimentation. Id. at 868. 
 178. The court discussed the meaning of the words “solely” and “reasonably” as they are used in 
the statute. See supra notes 143, 146, 147 and accompanying text. When articulating which activities 
are “reasonably related” to the FDA approval process, the court notes that the role of Hatch-Waxman 
in facilitating expedited approval of a generic version of a drug previously approved by the FDA gives 
the phrase’s meaning a context. 331 F.3d at 866. Thus, the activities protected by the safe harbor are 
those that involve pre-expiration activities “reasonably related” to acquiring FDA approval of a drug 
on the market. Id. at 867. Nonetheless, there is no guidance from the court as to which pre-expiration 
activities are reasonably related to the FDA approval process.  
 179. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity in Federal Circuit Formalism, 
20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 1 (2003) (stating that the Federal Circuit has a 
tendency towards bright-line rules that transcends any particular issue in patent law); John R. Thomas, 
Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 792 (2003). 
Patent jurisprudence increasingly reflects a trend towards adjudicative rule formalism. Some 
of the most prominent principles of the patent law, governing the subject matter that can be 
patented, rights acquisition, and the scope of protection, have become more rulebound. . . . 
The Federal Circuit seems ever more prone to the pronouncement of categorical rules meant 
to govern future patent disputes. 
Id. at 792–93. 
 See generally Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent 
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1040 (2003) (discussing the implications of the Federal 
Circuit’s bright-line rulemaking policy). 
 180. Holbrook, supra note 179, at 9 (stating that the Federal Circuit has a penchant to articulate 
formalistic substantive rules). For example, in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., the Federal 
Circuit determined that claim construction was always a matter of law which eliminated the role of 
juries in patent cases. 52 F.3d 967, 976–79 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that “in a case tried to a jury, the 
court has the power and obligation to construe as a matter of law the meaning of language used in the 
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uniformity and certainty in patent law.181 Despite its tendencies, the 
Integra court leaves pharmaceutical manufacturers and biotechnology 
patentees wondering about the scope of activities that will be protected 
under the safe harbor in the future.182 While correctly decided, if the 
Integra court’s goal was to promote certainty in patent law, defining the 
pharmaceutical activities that are “reasonably related” to the FDA 
approval process would have advanced that goal.  
Furthermore, it is peculiar that the Federal Circuit overlooked the 
Southern District of New York’s Bristol decision.183 Both cases have 
similar fact patterns, yet reached different outcomes.184 Because the Bristol 
court held that the infringing activities were protected by the safe harbor, 
the Federal Circuit could have enhanced the certainty behind its ruling by 
addressing any perceived differences with the Bristol decision.185 
Although not binding on the Federal Circuit, the court’s failure to mention 
Bristol was unusual because that case “open[ed] up the floodgate” for free 
use of methods and patented chemicals by any company developing a new 
drug.186 Essentially, Bristol was one of the first cases that threatened the 
biotechnology industry’s intellectual property assets. 
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit’s Integra decision does put research-
based pharmaceutical companies on notice. Despite previous decisions by 
other courts, the Federal Circuit will not tolerate the infringement of 
research tool patents for the commercial development of a new drug. As a 
patent claim”). And recently the Federal Circuit concluded that “any amendment to a claim precludes 
all equivalents as to that added claim limitation.” Holbrook, supra note 179, at 5 (discussing Festo 
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). However, the 
Court’s bright-line rules tend to sacrifice fairness in patent law. Id. at 1. 
 181. See Holbrook, supra note 179, at 1. In Control Resources, Inc. v. Delta Electronics, Inc., 
Judge Young recognized the Federal Circuit as “a court with a mission.” 133 F. Supp.2d 121, 123 (D. 
Mass. 2001). Congress charged the Federal Circuit with “providing more consistent guidance to 
innovative industry, the Patent Office, and others impacted by the patent system.” Thomas, supra note 
179, at 793. The Supreme Court stated, “[i]t was just for the sake of such desirable uniformity that 
Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as an exclusive appellate court for patent 
cases.” Markman v. Westviews Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 
20–23 (1981)). 
 182. See Groombridge & Calabro, supra note 33, at 463 (stating that Integra may create 
uncertainty as to what is permitted under the safe harbor and may actually impede the progress of 
biomedical innovation).  
 183. See supra notes 124–32 and accompanying text. 
 184. See supra notes 62–78, 124–33 and accompanying text. 
 185. Like the Bristol court, the Federal Circuit recognizes the importance of biotechnology tool 
patents to the industry; stating, “[b]ecause the downstream clinical testing for FDA approval falls 
within the safe harbor, these patented tools would only supply some commercial benefit to the inventor 
when applied to general research.” 331 F.3d at 867.  
 186. See Warburg & Maebius, supra note 11, at 28 (discussing the dangers of the Bristol 
decision).  
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result, innovating pharmaceutical companies must conduct thorough 
research when using research tools to develop drugs, in order to discover 
which research tools are in the public domain and which are under patent 
protection.187 While the Integra court has narrowed the scope of the 
Hatch-Waxman safe harbor, its future implication on the biotechnology 
industry remains unclear. 
VIII. PROPOSAL: A TEST FOR DETERMINING WHEN ACTIVITIES FALL 
WITHIN THE SAFE HARBOR  
Initially, the purpose of the safe harbor was to overrule Roche and 
create a means for generic drug manufacturers to enter the market as soon 
as the brand-name patent expired.188 The 1984 Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, which considered the bill, further explained that the purpose 
of the safe harbor is to exclude from patent infringement liability 
experimentation with a patented drug product, when the purpose is to 
prepare for commercial activity beginning when a valid patent expires.189  
The justification expressed by Congress in overruling Roche was that 
the pharmaceutical “experimental activity does not have any adverse 
economic impact on the patent owner’s exclusivity during the life of a 
patent, but prevention of such activity would extend the patent owner’s 
commercial exclusivity beyond the patent expiration date.”190  
The 98th Congress explained the safe harbor in terms of drugs and the 
pharmaceutical industry.191 While Congress admitted that other products 
are affected by pre-marketing and manufacturing regulations, the safe 
harbor is explained in the context of drug approval and the FDA.192 In this 
context, it is hard to imagine that Congress, with no knowledge of the 
present-day biotechnology industry, intended to allow research tool 
infringers to escape liability.  
 187. See Marc S. Friedman & Joel N. Bock, A New Toll Booth on the Research Highway for 
Pharmas: Reconsidering the Research Use Exemption to Patent Infringement, NEW JERSEY LAWYER, 
Oct. 2003, at 17, 19 (stating that failing to define which activities are “reasonably related” to the FDA 
approval process could lead to other problems for owners of research tool patents in the biotechnology 
industry; despite the Federal Circuit’s decision, there are other roads a company can travel to “avoid 
and exploit such limitations on the use of patented research tools”); see also supra note 182. 
 188. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.  
 189. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2678.  
 190. Id. at 2679. 
 191. Id. at 2678–79. 
 192. Id. 
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While the Federal Circuit in Integra seemed to recognize that research 
tools were not protected by the safe harbor,193 it failed to articulate a test 
that would ensure equal application of the safe harbor in the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry. The court seemed to say that 
research tool infringement is never protected by the safe harbor and 
everything else must be “reasonably related” to the FDA approval process. 
Instead of the uncertainty inherent in determining whether activities are 
“reasonably related” to the FDA approval process, and whether a patented 
technology is a drug or research tool, a three-part test should be used when 
evaluating whether infringing activities are shielded from liability under 
the Hatch-Waxman safe harbor. First, infringing activity must be for the 
purpose of establishing bioequivalence that will be used for FDA 
approval. Second, the infringing activity must not have any adverse 
economic impact on the patent owner’s exclusive use.194 Third, as a policy 
consideration, prevention of the infringing activity must not cause a de 
facto extention of the patent owner’s commercial exclusivity beyond the 
patent expiration date.195  
 193. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. 
granted, 73 U.S.L.W. 3059 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2005) (No. 03-1237) (stating that exaggerating the safe harbor 
out of context would “swallow the whole benefit of the Patent Act” for some biotechnological 
inventions).  
 194. This prong of the test mirrors the intent of Congress when they enacted section 271(e)(1). See 
supra text accompanying note 190. 
 195. Id. Policy considerations are derived by examining the purpose of the federal patent system. 
A patent gives the inventor the right to “exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention” in 
the United States. MARTIN J. ADELMAN, RANDALL R. RADER, JOHN R. THOMAS & HAROLD C. 
WEGNER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 6–7 (2d ed. 2003). As such, the U.S. patent 
system: 
embodies a carefully crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, 
useful, and nonobvious advances in technology and design in return for the exclusive right to 
practice the invention for a period of years. . . . In consideration of its disclosure and the 
consequent benefit to the community, the patent is granted. 
Id.  
 There are four primary philosophical theories (policy considerations) that form the foundation of 
the patent system: (1) “natural rights;” (2) “reward for services rendered;” (3) “monopoly profits 
incentive;” and (4) “exchange for secrets.” JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 
23–26 (2003). The natural rights theory is “based on the work of John Locke . . . who believed that 
God gave the earth to people in common;” when people mix their labor with objects found in the 
common they make it their property. Id. at 24. The reward for services rendered theory simply 
suggests that society should reward inventors for the useful service (invention) that they perform for 
society. Id. at 25. The monopoly profits incentive theory rests on the assumption that “innovation is 
good for society, and that the correct incentive” to disclose this innovation is market exclusivity. Id. at 
25. The exchange for secrets theory rests on the assumption that “most innovation would remain 
secret, but for the incentive to disclose;” thus, the patent system is often viewed as a quid pro quo 
exchange of secrets for the right to exploit the invention. Id. at 26. Note, these policy considerations 
are utilized to buttress the dissent of Judge Newman in Integra. See supra note 158. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1169 Eidson book pages.doc3/29/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
1196 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:1169 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluating Integra using this test reveals the usefulness of its 
application. Even if Merck could have shown that its activities were 
reasonably related to the FDA approval process, its activities would still 
be unprotected by the safe harbor because the activities would have an 
adverse effect on the value of Integra’s research tool patent.196 Generally, 
research tools are developed as a product to be used in research, and the 
very use of a research tool infringes the economic interest of the 
biotechnology developer. Conversely, drugs are developed as a product for 
sale and a drug manufacturer will not be adversely affected as long as the 
infringer does not offer the drug for sale while it is under patent 
protection.197 Finally, preventing this type of infringement does not cause 
a de facto extention of the patent owner’s commercial exclusivity beyond 
the patent term.198 Essentially, this test eliminates the slippery-slope logic 
inherent in the “reasonably related” language and protects the 
biotechnology industry by ensuring that assets patented as research tools 
may not be infringed upon. 
 196. By using the research tool, Merck used a patented product in the same manner in which it 
derives its economic value. 
 197. The product differentiation between a research tool and a drug is instrumental to this 
analysis. For the purpose of this test, the key difference between the two is how they derive their value. 
Cf. supra note 125 (the NIH distinguishes research tools from “end products”); Derzko, supra note 
125, at 350–51 (discussing research tools and “end products”). Commercially, research tools are 
created to be licensed or sold for the purpose of discovery research. See supra note 125. They derive 
royalties because they can be used in the research process. However, drugs are typically products that 
are bought and sold. They derive their commercial value from sales based upon a market price. Thus, 
infringement activities which have an adverse economic impact on research tools and drugs include 
any activity that mirrors how research tools and drugs derive their commercial value. In some 
instances, the characteristics of drugs and research tools may overlap in a particular product. However, 
because the focus of the test is on economic impact and not compound classification, the test should 
not be rejected.  
 The test is uniformly applied to both research tools and drugs once the distinction is made 
between the different ways infringement can have an adverse economic impact on the patentee. A 
generic drug offered for sale while the brand-name drug is under patent protection is straight patent 
infringement and not within the guise of the safe harbor. Thus, the determination of whether the 
infringement has an adverse economic impact on the patentee will only be relevant if it is the type of 
infringement sought to be protected by the safe harbor: establishing bioequivalency.  
 Also, differences in compound classification can ultimately affect the analysis of a court. See 
supra note 166 (discussing Judge Newman’s disagreement over what constitutes a research tool). One 
of the key advantages of the adverse economic impact test is that it protects research tools and drug 
intermediates (compounds that could be end-product drugs or research tools) while shielding the courts 
from having to determine whether a compound is a drug, drug intermediate, or research tool.  
 198. By preventing the de facto extension of a patent right, the test remains true to the policy 
theories underlying the U.S. patent system. See supra note 195. The third prong of the test maintains 
the balance behind the unilateral exchange of market exclusivity for innovation while not allowing the 
patentee to usurp extra economic rewards. Essentially, this ensures that competitors are not penalized 
and patentees are not rewarded for delays caused by the FDA. 
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Applying this test to the Bristol case199 illustrates the value of its utility. 
Bristol was shielded from liability when it infringed Rhone’s drug 
intermediates, or research tools, to develop a new drug.200 Applying the 
“reasonably related” test, the court held that the infringement activity was 
for the development of a new drug that would eventually lead to FDA 
approval, and thus Bristol was not liable.201 Under the first prong of the 
proposed test, it is not entirely clear that Bristol’s infringing activity was 
for the purpose of establishing bioequivalence that will be used for FDA 
approval. Bristol’s infringement was in a “search and development 
program”202 to find a “preeminent anti-cancer drug,”203 which may not 
qualify under the bioequivalence prong.  
Assuming, arguendo, that Bristol’s activities satisfy the first part of the 
test, it must then be shown that its infringing activities did not have an 
adverse economic effect on Rhone’s research tools. Here Rhone would 
need to show that its research tools derived their value from use in drug 
discovery, and they were not end-product drugs themselves. If this is true, 
then Bristol has infringed a patent to the economic detriment of Rhone and 
is liable for patent infringement because utilization of the research tool 
patent to discover new drugs is how the research tool derives its value (just 
as selling a drug is the means by which drugs derive their value). Finally, 
holding Bristol liable for its infringing activities would not have enhanced 
Rhone’s commercial exclusivity of the patent beyond its term’s expiration. 
There is no regulatory process for research tools;204 consequently, there is 
 199. See supra notes 124–33 and accompanying text.  
 200. See supra notes 124–33 and accompanying text. 
 201. See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text. 
 202. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19361, at *14. 
 203. Id.  
 204. Cf. Anna Wilde Mathews & David P. Hamilton, FDA Takes Step Toward Allowing Generic 
Versions of Biotech Drugs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2004, at A1 (stating that there is no FDA process for 
approving generic versions of biotechnology drugs). Furthermore, the Hatch-Waxman Act did not 
cover the “then-new field of biotechnology. Today, nearly all biotechnology medicines are regulated 
under a different law from the one covering traditional drugs.” Id. at A6. The reason for treating the 
biotechnology industry different from the pharmaceutical industry is due to the nature of the product 
produced: 
Traditional chemical drugs are easier to duplicate than biotech medicines, in part because the 
active ingredients are relatively small molecules that are straightforward to analyze. . . . 
Biotech medicines, by contrast, are generally produced by splicing a genetic sequence that 
corresponds to a particular protein, such as human insulin, into living cells. 
Id. at A1. 
 While generic makers of chemical drugs have been able to utilize Hatch-Waxman provisions to 
shortcut the FDA approval process, the FDA contends it lacks the authority to approve generic 
versions of most biotechnology products. Id. Thus, no matter how one views biotechnology research 
tools, either as an intermediate or end compound, they are not subject to the same regulatory processes 
as chemical drugs.  
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no delay involved in procuring the research tool as soon as the patent 
expires.  
Applying a test that considers the economic distinction between drug 
and research tool patent infringement creates certainty regarding which 
activities are protected from infringement liability under the Hatch-
Waxman safe harbor. Focusing on the type of product infringed upon and 
how that product derives its value (e.g., sale versus use) ensures a uniform 
application of the safe harbor in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
industries while remaining true to the policy considerations inherent in the 
U.S. patent system.205  
IX. CONCLUSION 
Integra gave the Federal Circuit the opportunity to determine how far 
down the chain of experimentation the Hatch-Waxman safe harbor reaches 
to shield patent infringers from liability. Case history reveals a trend on 
behalf of the courts to increase the scope of the safe harbor to afford 
greater protection for patent infringement.206 In deciding the issue at hand, 
the Integra court correctly determined that infringing use of a research tool 
is not protected under the safe harbor. However, contrary to its formalistic 
nature, the court failed to create a bright-line rule to determine which 
infringing activities are shielded from liability by the safe harbor. 
To remedy this situation and enhance the certainty in safe harbor 
litigation, this Note proposes utilizing a three part test that accurately 
reflects the congressional intent and policy considerations behind the safe 
harbor. By focusing on the economic impact that the infringing action has 
on the patent holder’s rights, the Hatch-Waxman safe harbor will achieve a 
uniform application in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, 
which are two industries that receive different treatment from the FDA.207 
Furthermore, the proposed test helps remedy the uncertainty inherent in 
the “reasonably related” analysis currently applied by the courts, and 
 205. See supra note 195 (discussing the policies behind the U.S. patent system). 
 206. See supra Part IV. 
 207. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.  
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protects firms in the biotechnology industry that rely on research tools as 
income-generating assets.208  
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